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Boundary Dispute: The Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality as Judicial Nondelegation
It has been said that congressional silence is an invitation for
other branches of government to exercise policymaking authority. 1 If
that aphorism holds true with respect to the judiciary, the current
Supreme Court appears to have categorically declined that invitation,
at least for cases involving extraterritorial activity.
In addressing extraterritorial cases, courts are confronted with a
question that has profound consequences for structural norms and
plaintiffs bringing claims under U.S. statutes: when should the laws
of the United States apply to activity occurring primarily in another
country? The Supreme Court has answered this question with the
presumption against extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory
interpretation that presumes, absent a clear congressional indication
to the contrary, that U.S. laws do not apply abroad. In the past six
years, the Court has applied the canon in a wide variety of cases—
from foreign securities suits and human rights claims to racketeering
and money laundering allegations brought by foreign countries.
Through these cases—which have critical repercussions for
transnational economic activity—the Court has established the
presumption against extraterritoriality as a strong categorical rule
that bars large swaths of suits by foreign plaintiffs.
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s use of the presumption against
extraterritoriality has attracted significant criticism from the academy.
Scholars have challenged the presumption as an unnecessarily blunt
instrument for managing conflict with foreign nations and a poor
proxy for congressional intent. 2 More importantly, the presumption’s
critics argue that it fails to preserve separation-of-powers interests, or
that by applying the presumption the Supreme Court engages in
judicial activism, supplanting its territorial vision for that of
Congress. 3 Criticisms of this variety have increased following RJR
1. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (discussing the interplay between congressional silence and executive power).
2. See infra Section III.A.
3. See infra Section III.B.

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, where the Court applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality separately to the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act’s (RICO) substantive
provisions and private cause of action. 4 In the hands of the current
Supreme Court, critics allege, the presumption “has paradoxically
become a thoroughly judge-directed creature” 5 used to “override
Congress in defining the proper scope of litigation in U.S. courts.” 6
This Comment challenges the idea that the presumption against
extraterritoriality has departed from its separation-of-powers
moorings. Instead, it argues that the Supreme Court’s recent
extraterritoriality jurisprudence makes sense when understood as
nondelegation. Specifically, the Court’s assumption that Congress
does not intend statutes to apply extraterritorially unless it clearly
states otherwise is, in fact, an assumption that Congress does not
delegate the enormous, policy-laden power of deciding whether to
extend the laws of the United States abroad to the judiciary. This
nondelegation assumption is grounded in a notion long associated
with the presumption against extraterritoriality—that the
Constitution assigns responsibility for both policy-making and
foreign affairs to the political branches, not the courts.
Viewing the presumption against extraterritoriality as
nondelegation sheds light on outstanding puzzles surrounding its
application. Not only does the characterization reconcile the
rationales the Supreme Court has used to justify the presumption, it
also refutes critiques that the presumption is merely territorialityoriented judicial activism. This nondelegation paradigm makes clear
that the Court’s use of the presumption is a request for
congressional guidance, rather than a policy decision by the Court.
By shifting the question of extraterritoriality back to Congress, the
Court cedes policy-laden decisions regarding the reach of U.S.
statutes to the political process and prevents lower courts from
embarking on expeditions in foreign policy-making without the
compass of clear congressional approval. Moreover, when
understood as nondelegation, it becomes apparent that the Court’s
4. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
5. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Frankenstein’s Monster of Extraterritoriality Law, 110
AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 51, 51 (2016).
6. Maggie Gardner, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
134, 134 (2016).
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insistence on applying the presumption against extraterritoriality
separately to private causes of action and in cases where there are
no apparent foreign affairs concerns reflects a coherent
interpretative approach.
The nondelegation characterization of the Supreme Court’s
extraterritoriality jurisprudence also explains the Supreme Court’s
commitment to the presumption against extraterritoriality to the
exclusion of other, more flexible approaches. Unlike these
discretionary inquiries, the presumption ensures that courts do not
wander into the fraught mists of foreign policy. By directing lower
courts to shift extraterritoriality inquiries to Congress, the Court
helps avert the problems that have resulted from previous judicial
attempts to provide answers to questions of foreign policy. While
ambiguities persist, they are ambiguities that call upon courts to
make interpretative determinations, rather than pure foreign policy
ones. In this sense, the presumption against extraterritoriality shifts
the interpretive game to the judiciary’s home court.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I lays out the history,
current status of, and common justifications for the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Part II argues that the presumption is an
application of the nondelegation doctrine to a congressional
delegation to the judiciary. Part III explains how understanding the
presumption against extraterritoriality as nondelegation helps solve
extant puzzles associated with the presumption against
extraterritoriality, such as why it applies in cases where there is no
potential for foreign conflict, separately to a statute’s substantive
provision and private right of action, and to jurisdictional statutes. It
also discusses the institutional competence and other considerations
underlying the Supreme Court’s apparent preference for the
presumption over other interpretive tools. Part IV concludes.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

This Part outlines the legal landscape with respect to the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Section A describes the
presumption in general terms and discusses its history and evolution,
with an emphasis on the Court’s three most recent extraterritoriality
cases, Morrison, Kiobel, and RJR Nabisco. Section B sets out the
rationales commonly associated with the presumption.
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A. Development of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

The presumption against the extraterritorial application of
statutes is a canon of statutory construction that assumes Congress
does not intend statutes to apply outside of the borders of the
United States unless the statutes clearly specify otherwise. The
presumption is not a limit on Congress’ legislative power—it does
not impede congressional directives clearly intended to apply
extraterritorially—but an assumption that “[w]hen a statute gives no
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” 7
The first judicial articulation of the presumption against
extraterritoriality was distinctly territorial. According to Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, fundamental principles of territoriality
demanded “in case of doubt . . . a construction of any statute as
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.” 8
Over time, however, this stringent territorial view of the
presumption against extraterritoriality gave way to variety of contextspecific factor tests. 9 Though nominally acknowledged, the
presumption against extraterritorially was rarely employed. 10
In 1991, however, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the
presumption in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco). 11 The
Aramco Court considered whether an American citizen fired in Saudi
Arabia12 could bring a Title VII discrimination suit against Aramco, a
U.S. corporation, given that the conduct and injury occurred outside
of the United States. 13 The Court held that absent clear
congressional intent to the contrary, it would construe statutes to

7. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
8. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (holding that the
Sherman Act applies only to conduct occurring within the territorial borders of the
United States).
9. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
10. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998).
11. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
12. The plaintiff in the case filed suit against Aramco and Aramco Services Company
(ASC), both of which were incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 247. While Aramco’s principal
place of business was Saudi Arabia, ASC’s was in Houston, Texas, which is where the plaintiffemployee was hired. Id.
13. Id. at 248.
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apply only to activity occurring within the United States. 14 Because
there was no clear evidence that Congress intended Title VII to
apply overseas, the presumption against extraterritoriality barred the
plaintiff’s claims. 15
Nearly twenty years after Aramco, the Court clarified the outlines
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd. 16 In Morrison, the Court considered whether
foreign investors could sue for fraud under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against National Australia Bank
with respect to securities listed on foreign stock exchanges. 17 The
alleged fraud arose when National Bank officials made public
statements that HomeSide, its Florida-based subsidiary, was
performing well but wrote down over two billion dollars of
HomeSide’s assets just one month later. 18 The Court’s analysis
considered both whether Congress had clearly indicated that section
10(b) applied extraterritorially and whether the domestic conduct
(the deceptive statements) rendered the presumption against
extraterritoriality inapplicable altogether. Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia answered the first question by noting that neither the
statutory text nor context indicated that Congress intended section
10(b) to apply abroad. 19 With respect to the second inquiry—
whether the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient domestic activity—the
Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
overcome only when the domestic conduct is the “focus” of the
statutory scheme. 20 Because the focus of the Exchange Act was
deception in connection with the sale of securities, and only the
deception—not the sale—occurred in the United States, the
domestic conduct was not sufficient to displace the presumption. 21
The Court continued to expand the presumption against

14. Id. at 253 (“If we were to permit possible, or even plausible, interpretations of
language such as that involved here to override the presumption against extraterritorial
application, there would be little left of the presumption.”).
15. Id.
16. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 252.
19. Id. at 264–65.
20. Id. at 266.
21. Id. at 268–69.
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extraterritoriality in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., which
involved Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims by Nigerian refugees
against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations for aiding and
abetting the Nigerian government in human rights abuses.22
Although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute and the presumption
against extraterritoriality is a merits doctrine, 23 Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion stated that the principles underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality “similarly constrain courts
considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.” 24
One of these underlying principles apparently was the need to
avoid the international contention that might result when courts
apply American law to activity occurring outside the borders of the
United States. The presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court
indicated, “ensure[s] that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt
an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences
not clearly intended by the political branches.” 25 The Court
suggested that “the danger of unwarranted judicial inference in the
conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS,”
since courts—not Congress—create the cause of action. 26 “Since
many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of
new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign
policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great
caution.” 27 The Court went on to hold that because the ATS itself
provides no indication of extraterritoriality, all of the actors were
foreign, and all of the relevant conduct took place in Nigeria, the
claims did not displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. 28
Kiobel seemed to signal that the Court would apply the

22. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
23. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004). Sosa held that the ATS gives
U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear claims based on certain violations of the law of nations, but
does not provide a cause of action. Id. Nonetheless, it may recognize a federal common law
cause of action to provide redress for those violations of norms of customary international law
that are as definite as the violations originally actionable at the passage of the ATS, in 1789. Id.
24. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
25. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727).
28. Id. at 1662, 1669. The Court stated that in future ATS cases, only those claims that
“touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the
presumption” would be successful. Id. at 1669.
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presumption against extraterritoriality to a wide range of federal
statutes—even those to which it might not obviously pertain. RJR
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 29 which considered whether
RICO applied to offenses perpetrated outside the United States,
further extended the presumption.
RICO establishes four criminal offenses aimed at illegal
enterprises “engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce” 30 and a
civil cause of action for “any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation” of one of the criminal provisions. 31
Specifically, RICO prohibits the investment of income derived
through a pattern of racketeering in an enterprise, 32 the acquisition
or maintenance of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, 33
conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, 34 or
conspiring to do any of the foregoing. 35 A pattern of racketeering
activity is a series of related predicate offenses that demonstrate the
existence or threat of continued criminal activity and involves the
commission of at least two predicate offenses within a ten-year
span. 36 Predicate offenses consist of various state and federal crimes,
including wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and supporting
foreign terrorist organizations, among many others. 37 To summarize,
a RICO violation occurs when a pattern of predicate crimes fits
within one of the four RICO criminal offenses. RICO’s civil cause of
action is more restrictive—it allows private plaintiffs to sue only
when a RICO violation results in an injury to their business
or property. 38
In RJR Nabisco, twenty-six European countries sought to sue
RJR Nabisco under RICO’s civil cause of action for its role in a
foreign drug trafficking and money laundering enterprise in which
the proceeds from the sale of drugs smuggled into Europe were used

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
§ 1964(c).
§ 1962(a).
§ 1962(b).
§ 1962(c).
§ 1962(d).
§ 1961(5).
§ 1961(1).
§ 1964(c).
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to pay for RJR Nabisco cigarettes. 39 Again invoking the presumption
against extraterritoriality, the Court articulated a two-step framework
based on Morrison and Kiobel:
At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute
gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.
We must ask this question regardless of whether the statute in
question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers
jurisdiction. If the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second
step we determine whether the case involves a domestic application
of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s “focus.” If
the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United
States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application
even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant
to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves
an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other
conduct that occurred in U.S. territory. 40

Applying this test, the Court held that Congress did intend
RICO’s criminal provisions to apply extraterritorially, but only to the
extent the underlying predicates overcame the presumption. 41 In
other words, the extraterritoriality of RICO predicates flows through
to RICO offenses—if none of the predicate statutes at issue in a
given case overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality,
RICO does not apply abroad by its own terms. Because the
predicates at issue in RJR Nabisco—money laundering, wire fraud,
mail fraud, material support of foreign terrorist organizations, and
Travel Act violations—were extraterritorial, RICO’s substantive
criminal provisions applied abroad in that case. 42
To the dismay of the European petitioners and many legal
commentators, however, the Court did not stop there. Citing
Kiobel’s holding that “the presumption . . . ‘constrain[s] courts
39. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2016).
40. Id. at 2101.
41. This unique structure, the Court observed, “ma[de] RICO the rare statute that
clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of
extraterritoriality.” Id. at 2103.
42. Id. at 2102 (“We emphasize the important limitation that foreign conduct must
violate a predicate statute that manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply
extraterritorially.” (internal quotations omitted)). As a result, U.S. authorities were free to
prosecute RJR Nabisco under RICO in a criminal case.
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considering causes of action,’” the Court held that the presumption
against extraterritoriality applies not only to a statute’s substantive
provisions, but also to the provisions that establish private rights of
action. 43 This separate extraterritoriality review, the Court reasoned,
is required by the principles informing Kiobel—namely, the potential
that “providing a private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a
potential for international friction beyond that presented by merely
applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign conduct.” 44 These
principles mandate additional scrutiny, even in cases where there is
no risk of international discord. 45 For that reason, it was immaterial
that the petitioners—the countries where the cases against RJR
Nabisco would otherwise be heard—expressly stipulated that
application of U.S. law would not result in controversy. 46 By
rejecting this stipulation, the Court eschewed extraterritoriality
review “based on a case-by-case inquiry that turns on or looks to the
affected sovereign’s consent,” 47 in favor of a categorical rule
applicable in every case of extraterritorial flavor.
In this second, separate extraterritoriality inquiry, the Court
found no clear indication from Congress that RICO’s private cause
of action ought to apply to injuries occurring outside of the United
States. 48 That the provision containing the civil cause of action
applied only where a plaintiff suffered injury to “business or
property” in connection with a RICO violation suggested that it was
not coextensive with RICO’s more inclusive substantive provisions.49
Because RICO’s private cause of action did not apply
extraterritorially, when the petitioners were unable to prove
a domestic injury, they failed to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 50

43. Id. at 2106 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659,
1664 (2013)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2100.
46. Id. at 2107–08.
47. Id. at 2095.
48. Id. at 2108.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2111.

435

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

B. Rationales for the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

RJR Nabisco reinvigorated debate about the presumption against
extraterritoriality that had been simmering since Aramco. Central to
this debate are the Supreme Court’s justifications for the
presumption. First, the Court has stated that the presumption is a
tool for managing conduct in foreign affairs because it “serves to
avoid the international discord that can result when United States
law is applied to conduct in foreign countries.” 51 Second, the Court
has justified the presumption as a “commonsense notion that
Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” 52
Third, the Court has hinted, 53 the presumption preserves separation
of powers and protects against judicial activism in foreign affairs. 54
Opponents of the presumption against extraterritoriality contend
that the justifications advanced by the Supreme Court to defend it
are invalid or that the presumption fails to fulfill its stated goals.55
These critics argue that the presumption should be removed from
the Court’s interpretative toolkit or at least diluted to better reflect
international norms and other policy interests. 56 The idea that the
presumption efficiently reduces the risk of foreign conflict, they say,
is flawed because international law recognizes other bases of
jurisdiction besides territoriality, and the Court applies the
presumption even in cases where there is obviously no possibility of
foreign discord. 57
Critics have also lambasted the “commonsense notion” that
Congress generally does not intend to apply extraterritorially,
arguing that an uptick in internationally-oriented statutes and
congressional responses to cases invoking the presumption belie this

51. Id. at 2100.
52. Id. As I argue in Part III, this assumption is rooted mainly in normative, structural
values, though it does align with empirical realities in some instances. See infra note 232 and
accompanying text.
53. Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 16 (2014) (noting that “courts do not typically rely on separation of powers to
justify the presumption against extraterritoriality”).
54. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997).
55. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 3; Colangelo, supra note 5, at 51.
56. Clopton, supra note 53, at 3.
57. Id. at 11.
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justification. 58 The separation-of-powers account of the presumption,
too, has come under fire: scholars suggest that the Court has used
the presumption to override congressional intent and ignore the
executive “rather than stay faithful to its origins as essentially a
separation-of-powers canon.” 59 These attacks came with particular
intensity and volume after RJR Nabisco; many felt the Court
overstepped its bounds by applying the presumption separately to
RICO’s private right of action. 60 By adopting a default territorial
rule, such critics have argued, the Court is merely exercising a
territorial brand of judicial activism. 61
These criticisms raise important questions. Why does the Court
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality even when there is
no obvious potential for foreign conflict? Is the presumption valid if
Congress passes statutes overriding the decisions in which it is
invoked? Is the Court merely supplanting its own territorial
preferences for the intent of Congress? And, in the wake of RJR
Nabisco, why does the Court insist on applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality separately to private rights of action when
the related substantive statute is extraterritorial? Parts II and III
argue that understanding the presumption against extraterritoriality
as nondelegation resolves these and other outstanding questions
about why the Court insists on applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality.
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY AS
JUDICIAL NONDELEGATION

This Part argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality
should be understood as an application of the nondelegation
doctrine to a delegation of foreign policymaking authority from
Congress to the judiciary. Section A provides an overview of the
nondelegation doctrine, including its more recent manifestation in
the narrow construction of statutory texts and describes how the
doctrine applies to courts. Section B supports the claim that the

58. Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 236 (1993).
59. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 55; see also Gardner, supra note 6, at 134–35.
60. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 55–56.
61. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 143.
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presumption against extraterritoriality should be viewed as
nondelegation with respect to the judiciary by showing that two
doctrines are based on similar rationales and make similar demands
of Congress. It also highlights examples of nondelegation in the
Supreme Court’s most recent extraterritoriality cases, responds to
potential challenges to viewing the presumption as nondelegation,
and discusses how the presumption may fit within the major
questions doctrine.
A. Nondelegation: Basic Principles

The nondelegation doctrine rests on the recognition that the
Constitution allocates distinct powers to each of the three branches
of federal government: “The difference between the departments
undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes,
and the judiciary construes the law . . . .” 62 The Constitution
allocates the legislative power to Congress, 63 and the Supreme Court
has held that “[t]he Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate
or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which
it is thus vested.” 64 However, it is well accepted that Congress is
empowered to delegate some matters to its coordinate branches,
though “the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate
and difficult inquiry.” 65 The nondelegation doctrine, then, deals with
“the standards for determining when Congress has crossed the
constitutional line between delegating legislative authority and
simply allowing executive and judicial actors to carry out their
constitutionally prescribed functions.” 66

62. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . ”).
64. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“‘[T]he integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate
its legislative power to another Branch.” (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892))).
65. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (“But Congress may certainly delegate to
others, power which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”).
66. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 99 (7th ed. 2016).
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1. Nondelegation as statutory interpretation

Although the nondelegation doctrine was at one time robust,67
its conventional application is now largely obsolete. The doctrine
typically arises with respect to congressional delegations to
administrative agencies; in that context, the Supreme Court allows
delegations that have an “intelligible principle” 68 and has taken a
very broad view of what counts as such. 69 The nondelegation
doctrine lives on, however, in narrowing statutory construction: “In
recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine
principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts,
and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory
delegations that might otherwise be thought to be
unconstitutional.” 70 Recognizing this trend, Professor Cass Sunstein
has argued that nondelegation’s continued vitality lies in “a set of
nondelegation canons, which forbid executive agencies from making
certain decisions on their own.” 71 The Court’s use of nondelegation
canons shows that the Court “has not surrendered the principles that
underlie the nondelegation doctrine.” 72 And, as previously noted,
those principles are fundamentally rooted in separation of
powers concerns.
One of the nondelegation canons that Professor Sunstein
identifies, albeit in the context of delegations to administrative

67. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Ref., 293 U.S. 388.
68. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
69. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
70. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989). For example, in The
Benzene Case, the Court declined to follow the Government’s expansive interpretation of
agency power under the Occupational Health and Safety Act because it “would make such a
‘sweeping delegation of legislative power’ that it might be unconstitutional under the Court’s
reasoning in [Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining]. A construction of the statute that
avoids this kind of open-ended grant should certainly be favored.” Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am.
Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980).
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000); see
also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 355
(observing that there are few limits on congressional delegations to the judiciary, but that “a
series of . . . ‘strict construction’ or ‘clear statement’ rules . . . tend to operate as nondelegation
doctrines within their respective fields of operation.”).
72. Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L.
REV. 19, 57 (2010) (emphasis added).
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agencies, is the presumption against extraterritoriality. 73 As the Court
established in Aramco, when it prevented the EEOC from
unilaterally deciding that Title VII applied abroad, agencies generally
may not decide the question of extraterritoriality. 74 The presumption,
Professor Sunstein posits, is a structurally inspired nondelegation
canon based on the “notion . . . that extraterritorial application calls
for extremely sensitive judgments involving international relations
[and] such judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking
process.” 75 The presumption against extraterritoriality thus ensures
that the executive branch does not make the decision of
extraterritoriality on its own. 76
2. Nondelegation and the judiciary

While nondelegation, including its most recent expression as an
interpretative device, is typically applied to delegations from
Congress to executive agencies, it applies equally to congressional
delegations to the judiciary. As Chief Justice John Marshall
recognized: “It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to
the Court, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and
exclusively legislative.” 77 Despite this prohibition, delegations to the
judiciary have largely escaped the attention of both the judiciary and
the academy. 78 This inattention is understandable, since Congress
almost never expressly delegates its power to the judiciary. Instead of
transferring legislative power outright, Congress typically shifts
power to courts by passing broad statutes—the type that impliedly
“call on courts to interpret vague statutory language or fill in
statutory gaps in the course of case-by-case adjudication.” 79

73. Sunstein, supra note 71.
74. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
75. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 333, 338 (“If . . . an agency is attempting on its own to
apply domestic law extraterritorially, we might believe that whatever its expertise, it is
inappropriate, as a matter of democratic theory and international relations, for this to happen
unless Congress has decided that it should.”).
76. Id. at 333.
77. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825).
78. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407–08 (2008); see also Aaron Nielson, Erie
as Nondelegation, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 266 (2011).
79. Lemos, supra note 78, at 438.
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Nonetheless, the same separation of powers considerations that
drive nondelegation concerns with respect to the executive branch
also apply to delegations from Congress to the judiciary. When
Congress passes large blocks of power to the courts, “[a]t some
point the judicial power . . . must ‘run out’ because the delegated
authority is just too great for the power exercised to be anything but
purely legislative.” 80 Concerns that Congress, with its superior
political accountability, should be responsible for policymaking apply
with even greater force where judicial delegations are concerned. “By
constitutional design, courts are less politically accountable than both
Congress and administrative agencies.” 81 That courts lack access to
the institutional resources necessary for making policy further weighs
in favor of applying nondelegation principles when Congress
delegates power to the courts. 82
This Comment connects the intuition that nondelegation
concerns apply to delegations from Congress to the courts to the
idea that judges enforce nondelegation through narrowing statutory
constructions. The following sections argue that the same
nondelegation principles served by the presumption against
extraterritoriality in the executive agency context apply when the
Court uses the canon to constrain the discretion of the judiciary. Just
as traditional nondelegation cases focus on upholding Congress’
constitutional designation as the nation’s policymaking body,
decisions invoking the presumption seek to preserve Congress’
policy-making role. When invoking the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the Court effectively rejects a broad delegation
(intended or otherwise) of foreign relations power by declining to
make the inherently policy-laden choice of whether to apply U.S.
statutes abroad. By refusing to seize upon congressional silence as a
grant of broad power that would allow the judiciary to unilaterally
determine the extraterritorial effect of U.S. statutes, the Court
speaks volumes about its structural role.

80. Nielson, supra note 78, at 241.
81. Id. at 267.
82. Lemos, supra note 78, at 445 (“If anything, [courts’ lack of policy expertise as
compared to administrative agencies] suggest[s] that delegations to courts should be
especially disfavored.”).
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B. Judicial Nondelegation and Extraterritoriality

This Section argues that by applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court rejects a broad delegation of
foreign relations power from Congress to the judiciary—the power
to determine whether statutes apply extraterritorially. This
characterization makes sense on several levels. First, the rationales for
the presumption against extraterritoriality align with the purposes of
the nondelegation doctrine. Second, both the presumption and
nondelegation doctrine place similar demands on Congress,
requesting guidance rather than restricting congressional power.
Third, Supreme Court cases invoking the presumption against
extraterritoriality are replete with evidence of nondelegation
principles. Fourth, the presumption against extraterritoriality also fits
the mold of a less conventional form of nondelegation—the major
questions doctrine. These similarities provide solid evidence
that
the
presumption against extraterritoriality embodies
nondelegation principles.
1. Shared rationales

The presumption against extraterritoriality should be understood
as nondelegation because the two seemingly distinct doctrines are
based on nearly identical rationales. Both doctrines are grounded in
the notion that some policy decisions simply must be made
by Congress.
On one hand, the nondelegation doctrine is a recognition that
“the basic policy decisions governing society are to be made by the
Legislature.” 83 While Congress may delegate certain powers to other
branches, which have their own constitutional powers, it alone can
make “strictly and exclusively legislative” decisions. 84 When Congress
makes large delegations of power to administrative agencies, the
modern Supreme Court uses narrowing statutory constructions to
shift complicated policy questions back to the legislative branch. 85
Just as it uses narrowing interpretations to blunt statutory
delegations that would transfer too much power to administrative

83. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825).
85. See supra Section I.A.
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agencies,
the Court utilizes the presumption
against
extraterritoriality to shift the policymaking power to determine
whether to apply U.S. law extraterritorially back to Congress. That
is, in cases where large foreign policy consequences might result, the
Court uses the presumption against extraterritoriality to “defer[]
such decisions, quite appropriately, to the political branches.”86
Indeed, the Court invokes the presumption precisely because
policymaking by the courts poses a “danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy.” 87 By preventing courts
from unilaterally deciding the statute’s geographic scope, the
presumption ensures Congress makes that important policy choice.
Thus, both the nondelegation doctrine and the presumption against
extraterritoriality protect structural values by routing policy decisions
through the legislative process rather than the courts.
The institutional competence considerations undergirding the
presumption against extraterritoriality provide further evidence of its
fit as a nondelegation principle. The Court applies the presumption
because “[Congress] alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly
such an important policy decision” as whether to apply a statute
extraterritorially. 88 Extending a statute outside of U.S. borders is one
decision that requires extensive information-gathering and
comprehensive decision-making capacities that courts simply do not
have. The conventional nondelegation doctrine involves similar
concerns. 89 In the words of Professor Aaron Nielson: “Congress
alone is entrusted with legislative powers because Congress alone is
institutionally designed to use them well, and, equally significant,
because Congress is uniquely restrained in its ability to
abuse them.” 90

86. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
87. Id. at 1661.
88. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). The Court
has routinely quoted this language in extraterritoriality decisions, indicating that it considers
the decision of a statute’s extraterritorial application a highly sensitive policy choice. See, e.g.,
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991)).
89. See infra note 186.
90. Nielson, supra note 78, at 244.
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2. Effect on Congress

The requirements that the presumption against extraterritoriality
imposes on Congress closely resemble those required by the Court’s
traditional nondelegation cases. The nondelegation doctrine requires
only that Congress articulate an “intelligible principle” when it is
delegating power, meaning that it broadly “delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of
The
presumption
against
this
delegated
authority.” 91
extraterritoriality, meanwhile, is overcome only by “the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed.” 92 In both instances, the
judiciary’s demands on Congress are modest—supply a broad
principle directing the use of legislative power to executive agencies
or, in the case of the presumption, specify that a statutory provision
should apply to foreign activity. While the two requirements are not
identical, the differences are due largely to the differences between
congressional delegations to agencies and courts, respectively. When
Congress delegates to an agency, it typically indicates by statute that
the agency has power to regulate in accordance with a specified
standard. By contrast, delegations to the judiciary are rare, 93 and
explicit delegations are almost nonexistent. But whether the Court
requests an intelligible principle or an indication of extraterritorial
intent, it is doing the same thing in both cases—requesting that
Congress supply more direction. In this sense, the presumption
against extraterritoriality and the nondelegation doctrine impose
similar requirements on Congress.
3. Judicial nondelegation in the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence

Supreme Court cases invoking the presumption against
extraterritoriality should be understood as nondelegation cases
because they typically involve the type of broad statutes that raise
nondelegation concerns. The following paragraphs demonstrate how
the Court applies the presumption against extraterritoriality to
statutes that are natural targets for nondelegation challenges. These

91. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
92. Benz, 353 U.S. at 147.
93. Lemos, supra note 78, at 444.
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statutes are not only silent on the question of extraterritoriality, but
frequently contain large delegations of power to the judiciary.
a. Aramco. The first such example is Aramco, where the
Court held that Title VII, an employment discrimination statute, did
not apply to discriminatory conduct occurring in Saudi Arabia. 94 In
vague, sweeping language, Title VII mandates that “[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 95 The responsibility for
filling the many gaps left by the statute’s broad terms has fallen to
the courts. 96 Confronted with the question of whether Title VII
applied to overseas activity, the Court invoked the presumption
against extraterritoriality because “[w]ithout clearer evidence of
congressional intent” it was “unwilling to ascribe to [Congress] a
policy which would raise difficult issues of international law.”97
Viewed through the lens of nondelegation, the Court determined
that the decision of whether to apply a statute abroad was so policyheavy that its judicial interpretative powers were maxed out; to
unilaterally extend U.S. law abroad would be to exercise
policymaking power that the Constitution vests in Congress rather
than courts. 98
b. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. The Court’s next
major extraterritoriality case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd., also fits the nondelegation mold. Recall that Morrison
considered whether the judicially created cause of action under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applied to

94. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
96. See Lemos, supra note 78, at 429 n.122 and accompanying text.
97. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1664 (2013) (invoking the presumption to “ensure that the Judiciary does not
erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not
clearly intended by the political branches” (citations omitted)).
98. Note that Aramco is typically understood as applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality to restrict the executive branch’s ability to make the decision of
extraterritoriality unilaterally. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 71, at 316. Still, the case can also
be understood as restricting a delegation to the judiciary; given Title VII’s broad terms, the
lack of direction on the question of extraterritoriality might be viewed as a congressional
invitation for judicial policy making—in other words, a delegation.
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extraterritorial conduct. 99 Once again, section 10(b) involves broad,
vague language. 100 A major reason that the Court applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality was to avoid the shortfalls of
the open-ended tests lower courts had used in evaluating the
extraterritoriality of 10(b). These tests—“complex in formulation
and unpredictable in application”—focused largely on divining what
Congress would have wanted if it had considered the question of
extraterritoriality. 101 By guessing at Congress’ intent, Morrison
suggests, lower courts were merely making foreign policy choices
under the guise of interpreting congressional intent. According to
the majority, the confusion and unpredictability that resulted from
this judicial lawmaking “demonstrate[d] the wisdom of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.” 102
Morrison’s concern with the indeterminacy of lower court
extraterritoriality tests evinces the Court’s preoccupation with the
same structural considerations that motivate the nondelegation
doctrine. The Court was not so much concerned with whether
section 10(b) should apply extraterritorially, but whether Congress
had in fact designated it as an extraterritorial statute. Just as in
nondelegation cases, where the Court ensures that Congress does
not delegate pure policymaking authority to another branch,
Morrison shows a profound concern with lower-court tests under
which judges were “essentially resolving matters of policy.” 103 That
the Court focused less on the policy choice itself and more on the
body making the policy choice suggests that the presumption is an
expression of nondelegation.
c. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In Kiobel, too, the
Court’s use of the presumption against extraterritoriality comports
with nondelegation principles. The Kiobel Court was tasked with
99. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange— . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”).
101. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010).
102. Id. at 261.
103. Id. at 259.
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determining whether the ATS applies to torts occurring outside the
United States. 104 The ATS, enacted by the first Congress in 1789,
states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 105 The statute is
jurisdictional only and does not create a cause of action; 106 its brevity
leaves many details in question. 107 Like Congress’ short, sweeping
directions in Title VII and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the
ATS is a fitting example of a broad delegation from Congress to the
judiciary. And, again, it is a statute to which the Court has applied
the presumption against extraterritoriality.
In Kiobel, the Court held that although the ATS has no
substantive provisions, “the principles underlying the canon of
interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action
that may be brought under the ATS.” 108 The “principles” to which
the Court refers are the need for courts to avoid the “danger of
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy”109
and the risk of “impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.” 110 As authority for
these principles, Kiobel cited Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which has
been highlighted as an example of the Court adopting narrowing
statutory construction to avoid nondelegation issues. 111 In Sosa, the
Court declined to afford courts free reign to recognize causes of
action under the ATS and instead cabined such causes of action to
norms of international law “defined with a specificity comparable to

104. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
106. The ATS “does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief. It instead allows
federal courts to recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of
international law.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
107. Though used several times in the United States’ early history, the statute fell into
disuse to such a degree that Judge Friendly called it a “legal Lohengrin” because “no one
seem[ed] to know whence it came.” See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1975).
108. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)); see also Paul B.
Stephan, Private Litigation as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 40,
43 (2016).
111. Nielson, supra note 78, at 289.
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the features” of those that existed when the ATS was passed. 112 It did
so, at least partly, because courts “have no congressional mandate
to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law
of nations.” 113
By invoking these same concerns about the role of courts vis-àvis the political branches in Kiobel, the Court signals that the
principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality are
the same nondelegation concerns it expresses in Sosa. Both Sosa and
Kiobel involve “a common nondelegation move”—giving a statute a
narrow construction in order to avoid nondelegation issues. 114 In
Sosa, which involved significant domestic conduct, the Court used a
narrowing construction based on historical evidence to confine
judicial discretion. 115 In Kiobel, it used the presumption against
extraterritoriality. But both cases ultimately reflect judicial
preoccupation with the same structural principle—nondelegation.
d. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. The breadth of
the statutes at issue in Aramco, Morrison, and Kiobel provide a useful
and dramatic illustration of the nondelegation concerns motivating
the Court in extraterritoriality cases. But the statute as a whole need
not be broad or ambiguous for nondelegation concerns to apply. So
long as Congress, by silence or otherwise, has effectively delegated a
momentous policy choice to the judiciary, the same structural
concerns are present. The Court’s opinion in RJR Nabisco implicitly
suggests that the Court considers the question of extraterritoriality
alone a large enough policy choice to warrant a narrowing
construction of the statute by way of the presumption. Because the
decision to allow private parties to sue is effectively a separate policy
choice that carries separate foreign affairs consequences, the Court’s
nondelegation concerns do not dissipate when Congress has
expressed an intent to apply a statute’s substantive provisions abroad.
Thus, even though RICO’s provisions are quite detailed when
compared to statutes in other presumption-against-extraterritoriality

112. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
113. Id. at 728.
114. Nielson, supra note 78, at 289.
115. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (“[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms
we have recognized.”).

448

427

Extraterritoriality as Judicial Nondelegation

cases, 116 Congress’ silence regarding the extraterritorial application of
RICO’s private right of action still delegates a significant policy
decision to the courts. By applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court adopts a narrowing statutory
construction to rebuff that delegation.
e. Apparent inconsistencies. It may be argued that these examples
cut against considering the presumption against extraterritoriality as
nondelegation since courts have previously accepted the invitation to
fill gaps in the substantive provisions of several of these statutes when
applied to domestic parties and conduct. For example, Title VII’s
broad language has left room for significant judicial innovation.117
Similarly, several justices have described the cause of action implied
from section 10(b) as “a judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn.” 118 If the Supreme Court is willing to
fill in substantive provisions—which undoubtedly involve at least
some policy choices—in the domestic context, why would it shy
away from making the policy choice of whether to apply the statute
extraterritorially? This was essentially the argument of Justice
Stevens’ Morrison concurrence, which challenged the Court’s
reluctance to engage in case-by-case reasoning on the question of
extraterritorial application when the “entire area of law [surrounding
section 10(b)] is replete with judge-made rules, which give concrete
meaning to Congress’ general commands.” 119 In light of the
apparent discrepancy between the Supreme Court’s interpretive
approach for foreign and domestic applications of the same statutes,
it might seem that the presumption against extraterritoriality does
not embody nondelegation principles.
There are at least two possible explanations for this apparent
inconsistency. First, the Supreme Court may treat the question of
whether to apply a law extraterritorially differently because of its

116. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 78, at 430, 433; Laura P. Moyer & Holley Tankersley,
Judicial Innovation and Sexual Harassment Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 65 POL.
RES. Q. 784, 784 (2012) (noting that “lack of legislative guidance” in Title VII led to judicial
policy-making).
118. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 276 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
737 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.)).
119. Id.
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impact on foreign affairs. As previously argued, the Court has
signaled that the question of extraterritoriality is a sufficiently
momentous foreign policy decision that it triggers nondelegation
concerns by itself. 120 Even if the question of extraterritoriality alone
were not sufficient to warrant nondelegation scrutiny, the Court has
historically been reticent to resolve matters of foreign affairs,
preferring to leave such matters to the political branches. 121 Indeed,
concern about the judiciary “run[ning] interference in . . . a delicate
field of international relations” 122 is one of the Court’s primary
justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality. When
there is a broad grant of policymaking authority to the judiciary and
the interpretive question involves foreign affairs, the combination of
these factors may bump the issue over the nondelegation threshold.
In other words, even if no nondelegation concerns arise when
courts fill gaps with respect to a particular statute’s domestic
application, there may still be nondelegation problems when courts
are asked both to fill gaps and make sensitive foreign policy
decisions. Under this understanding, the presumption against
extraterritoriality reflects nondelegation principles because it protects
the division of power established by the Constitution, which “assigns
principal policymaking authority, as well as principal authority over
foreign affairs, to the legislative and executive branches rather than
to the judicial branch.” 123
The second explanation is that the Court has pivoted away from
the type of broad, judicial gap-filling that was previously the norm.
In other words, the apparent inconsistency in viewing the
presumption against extraterritoriality as judicial nondelegation when
the Court has previously filled gaps in domestic applications of the
same statutes may boil down to a shift in the Court’s view about
judicial gap-filling, 124 especially where extraterritoriality is concerned.
120. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
122. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
123. Bradley, supra note 54, at 516.
124. See, for example, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), where the Court
declined to imply a private cause of action for section 602 of Title VI because “[l]ike
substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by
Congress.” Id. at 286. The Court had previously implied a cause of action to the adjacent
section 601 of Title VI, Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979), but “[h]aving sworn
off the habit of venturing beyond Congress’s intent, [it would] not accept [the] invitation to
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For example, the majority in Morrison countered Justice Stevens’s
observations about judge-made rules 125 by pointing out that court
rulings in section 10(b) cases had resulted in widespread confusion:
“The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation
before the court—demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption
against extraterritoriality.” 126
In addition to its reluctance to undertake extraterritoriality
inquiries with little statutory guidance in other contexts, the
Supreme Court may also be rethinking whether the presumption
against extraterritoriality should not apply to antitrust cases. The
Sherman Act is arguably the best example of a broad delegation of
policymaking power from Congress to courts, 127 a delegation courts
have accepted wholeheartedly. And unlike Title VII and section
10(b), the presumption against extraterritoriality apparently does not
apply to antitrust suits under the Sherman Act. 128 This, however, may
be changing. Justice Alito’s opinion in RJR Nabisco casts doubt on
the rationales articulated in antitrust cases decided “before we honed
our extraterritoriality jurisprudence in Morrison and Kiobel.”129
Although Justice Alito was discussing cases interpreting the Clayton
Act rather than the Sherman Act, his opinion suggests that recent
developments in the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence may
have one last drink.” Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“Not only is it “far better” for Congress to so specify when it
intends private litigants to have a cause of action, but . . . this Court in the future should be
extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the
Legislative Branch.”).
125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
127. Lemos, supra note 78, at 461. Professor Lemos notes that the Sherman Act’s
legislative history suggests that Congress intended courts to fill in the contours of the statute
in the common law tradition.
128. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
129. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2110 (2016). Justice Alito’s
response to an argument that RICO should be interpreted similarly to the Clayton Act, since
Congress modeled RICO after the Clayton Act, suggests that the modern presumption may
conflict with past interpretations of antitrust statutes. In Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India,
434 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1978), the Court had allowed India to sue under the Clayton Act for
extraterritorial conduct. Justice Alito observed that Pfizer was decided before the Court had
“honed” its presumption against extraterritorially jurisprudence, implying that analogy to
Pfizer was unpersuasive.
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have altered the playing field for future antitrust cases. This is
especially true given that Justice Alito cites private antitrust suits as a
source of “considerable controversy in other nations.” 130 Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire also seemed to hint at
this possibility; if not for the Supreme Court precedent on point,
which he begrudgingly followed, Scalia would have applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 131 These indications suggest
the Court may not have had its final say on the presumption in
relation to antitrust cases. 132 This in turn provides further evidence
that the Supreme Court’s willingness to accept congressional
invitations to fill large gaps in broad statutes may be decreasing, at
least where questions of extraterritoriality are implicated.
4. The presumption against extraterritoriality and “major questions”

The presumption against extraterritoriality might also be
considered nondelegation through the “major questions” doctrine.
The basic idea of the major questions doctrine—a species of
nondelegation—is that some questions are simply too important for
Congress to delegate to another branch, particularly when the
delegation is purportedly accomplished through inauspicious
statutory language. Put differently, the Court gives narrowing
constructions in cases that “both (1) involve a ‘fundamental’ or
‘extraordinary’ expansion of regulatory authority and (2) are based
on a ‘vague or ancillary’ statutory provision.” 133 The Supreme Court
has invoked this doctrine to give a narrowing construction to
congressional delegations to executive agencies in a variety of famous
cases, 134 including Whitman v. American Trucking, 135 FDA v. Brown
& Williams Tobacco Corp., 136 Gonzales v. Oregon, 137 and King v.

130. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2016 (internal quotations omitted).
131. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Of course, any reconsideration of whether the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to the Sherman Act would necessarily involve interpreting Congress’ extraterritorial
intent as expressed in the Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6a (2012).
133. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 72, at 22.
134. Id. at 10, 37.
135. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
136. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
137. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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Burwell. 138 In essence, the Court avoids an expansive interpretation
of statutory text that does not clearly contemplate the expansive
result. For example, the Supreme Court did not give Chevron
deference to the FDA’s interpretation of the term “drug” as
including nicotine because the power to regulate the entire tobacco
industry was so large that Congress could not have intended to
delegate it to the FDA through a single word. 139
The presumption against extraterritoriality might be viewed as an
application of the major questions doctrine to congressional
delegations to the judiciary. When it employs the presumption, the
Court could be seen as holding that the question of extraterritorial
application is simply too large a policy decision to be delegated to
courts through congressional silence. Congress, the Court might
assume, simply would not hide the “elephant” of extraterritoriality in
the “mousehole” of silence or ambiguous text.
Of course, the major questions doctrine has been criticized for its
indeterminacy and amenability to judicial manipulation: “One
judge’s mouse is another judge’s elephant, and it ever will be so.”140
Although this assessment is a valid critique of the major questions
doctrine as applied to executive agencies, the problem
of indeterminacy is less acute in the narrow context of
extraterritoriality. 141 Most cases invoking the major questions
doctrine do so on an ad hoc and idiosyncratic basis—courts use the
doctrine to narrow the language of a single statute in a way unlikely
to be replicated for other statutes. The extraterritoriality inquiry, on
the other hand, is an overarching question that recurs across a
number of different statutes. In essence, the Supreme Court has
categorically indicated that the question of extraterritoriality, either
for a statute’s substantive provisions or private cause of action, is
always a major question. While the decision to label extraterritoriality

138. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)
139. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 133 (“[W]e must be guided to a degree
by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of
such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.”).
140. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 72, at 23.
141. See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 341 (noting that nondelegation canons like the
presumption against extraterritoriality “do not require judges to resolve a hard issue about
degree (how much discretion is too much discretion?) and allow judges instead to draw clear
lines (for example, if the statute is ambiguous, it may not be applied extraterritorially)”).
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as a major question in the first place may be subject to scrutiny, the
doctrine can be consistently applied after that threshold decision. In
this sense, the presumption-against-extraterritoriality brand of the
major questions doctrine results not in unpredictable judicial cherry
picking, but a “stable background against which Congress can
legislate with predictable effects.” 142
In sum, the presumption against extraterritoriality should be
understood as an incarnation of nondelegation principles. Both
interpretive tools are based on the fundamental premise that
Congress cannot delegate certain legislative authority to other
branches of government for structural and institutional competence
reasons. Both place minimal demands on Congress—requesting a
modicum of guidance rather than limiting congressional power per
se. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent presumption-againstextraterritoriality cases bear the hallmarks of nondelegation
and fit comfortably within alternative formulations of the
nondelegation doctrine.
III. EXTANT EXTRATERRITORIALITY PUZZLES AND NONDELEGATION

Unsurprisingly, the Court’s use of the presumption against
extraterritoriality has sparked significant discussion in academic
circles. The vast majority of the commentary, especially regarding
recent cases, has been negative. Critics have challenged the
presumption as a crude tool for managing foreign affairs and
understanding congressional intent. They also dispute the canon’s
efficacy as a separation-of-powers tool, suggesting that the Court
overrides legislative intent, cuts the executive out of the
extraterritorial equation, and demands too much of Congress when
it applies the presumption separately to a statute’s substantive
provisions and private cause of action. These alleged deficiencies can
ultimately be explained by viewing the presumption against
extraterritoriality as a principle of nondelegation. Specifically, the
nondelegation understanding makes sense of why the Court (A)
applies the presumption in cases devoid of foreign controversy,
(B) describes the presumption as a “commonsense” view of
congressional intent, (C) is not exercising judicial activism, (D)

142. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
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applies the presumption to causes of action underlying jurisdictional
statutes, and (E) has not adopted alternatives to the presumption.
A. Nondelegation and Foreign Conflict

The need to avoid unintended foreign conflicts is a recurring
theme in presumption-against-extraterritoriality cases. The Supreme
Court has stated that it invokes the presumption in cases where
congressional intent is ambiguous to “protect against unintended
clashes between [U.S.] laws and those of other nations.” 143 “Risk of
conflict,” the Court has said, brings “the need to enforce the
presumption [to] its apex,” especially with respect to private suits.
But as the Court itself acknowledges, “risk of conflict between [an]
American statute and a foreign law is not a prerequisite for applying
the presumption against extraterritoriality.” 144
1. Overinclusivity and nondelegation

Seizing on this apparent anomaly, a number of scholars have
questioned why a canon used to prevent foreign conflict applies
where such conflict is clearly impossible. Professor Zachary Clopton,
for example, argues the presumption is overinclusive and therefore
poorly tailored to the role of preventing conflict with foreign laws.145
For this proposition, he cites Smith v. United States, where the
Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to
a tort claim based on conduct occurring on a scientific expedition in
Antarctica, which has no law and is governed by no foreign
sovereign. 146 The result in Smith, Clopton implies, demonstrates the
absurdity of the presumption as a means for managing foreign

143. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also RJR Nabisco,
Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (stating that the presumption “serves
to avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in
foreign countries”). Note that this rationale emphasizes the potential for conflicts with foreign
law (the laws of foreign states), rather than international law, which, in the context of
extraterritoriality, typically means customary international law. See Clopton, supra note 53,
at 11.
144. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107 (internal quotations omitted).
145. Clopton, supra note 53, at 5, 11, 16 (arguing that “the cases to which courts have
applied the presumption demand more than a one-size-fits-all response”).
146. Id. at 11 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 199 (1993)).
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conflict. 147 He further argues that because international law principles
of prescriptive jurisdiction allow jurisdiction on bases besides
territoriality, the presumption is unduly restrictive. 148 Echoing these
sentiments, Professor Carlos Vasquez claims that the current vision
of extraterritoriality “significantly overprotects the interest in
international comity,” 149 while Professor Larry Kramer contends that
“before restricting American law to avoid conflicts with foreign law,
[the Court] should make sure that there is a conflict.” 150 In short,
these scholars protest that the presumption is needlessly conciliatory
to foreign interests.
It is undoubtedly true that the strict presumption against
extraterritoriality is overbroad in its aversion to foreign conflict. This
result, however, is not merely an unintended consequence of a
haphazardly drawn bright line rule. Rather, it is the result required
by the nondelegation doctrine. Adopting an interpretation that
would extend the force of U.S. law to the territory of another
sovereign is unquestionably a policy choice, regardless of whether
international law allows the result. As the Court has expressly
recognized, questions of foreign policy “should be directed to the
Congress rather than to us.” 151 Although the Supreme Court’s
decision to draw the default line of statutory application at the
United States’ territorial borders may seem arbitrary, it is the only
decision that effectively minimizes the Court’s policymaking role. Ad
hoc approaches, 152 a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality, 153 and
even the Charming Betsy canon (considered alone) 154 would all
require the Court to decide by itself whether an ambiguous statute
should apply abroad. That choice oozes policy in a field—foreign

147. Id.
148. Id. at 11, 24.
149. Carlos M. Vasquez, Out-Beale-ing Beale, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 68,
69 (2016).
150. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991
SUP. CT. REV. 179, 217 (1991).
151. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
22 (1963).
152. See infra Section III.E.2.
153. See Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 659–70 (1990) (proposing a
presumption in favor of extraterritoriality).
154. See infra Section III.E.1.
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relations—the Court has described as “committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
Departments of the Government.” 155
While the Court often does frame its justifications for the
presumption in terms of foreign affairs, it is quick to recognize that
it is guarding against unintended consequences that courts simply do
not have the institutional capacity to foresee. In Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., for example, the Supreme Court refused to
apply a U.S. labor statute to a dispute between a foreign ship and its
foreign crew because, when it came to the question of
extraterritoriality, “[Congress] alone ha[d] the facilities necessary to
make fairly such an important policy decision.” 156 This is a
nondelegation argument. That the Court applies the presumption in
all cases, even those where no foreign conflict appears, shows that
the focus is on the decision-making body. Thus, the presumption
does not reflect concern about the foreign policy outcome in a
particular case, but rather the Court’s structural judgment that the
Constitution assigns policy choices of this type to the political
branches. In turn, it reflects the intuition that following that
structural allocation is likely to produce desirable, or at least
democratically sustainable, foreign policy results as a byproduct.
The nondelegation paradigm thus provides an explanation for
the presumption’s supposed foreign affairs problem. The Court
applies the presumption in all cases, even those where foreign
conflict is not a bona fide issue because the decision of
extraterritorial application is, categorically, a policy decision Congress
should make. Of course, labeling the extraterritoriality question as a
policy choice in cases that do not involve foreign conflict may, on the
surface, seem to beg the question. After all, the policy element
would seem to disappear where no ostensible foreign conflict is
immediately salient. But cases occurring in the territory of another
sovereign inevitably involve foreign relations even if they do not
involve foreign conflict. Even if a court concludes that applying a
statute abroad would raise no foreign relations problems, that
conclusion is itself a foreign policy decision that judges should not
make. On a practical level, courts’ inability to make holistic decisions

155. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
156. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 138–39, 146–47 (1957).
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may prevent them from foreseeing all of the consequences of foreign
policy decisions. 157 In other words, the problem is not that each case
is necessarily sensitive per se, but that foreign affairs cases as a
category involve sensitive choices.
Thus, even where practical obstacles dissipate, the structural
prohibition on judicial lawmaking remains to prevent lower courts
from getting too close to the foreign-affairs abyss. Because the
Supreme Court cannot decide which cases come before lower courts
or review every extraterritoriality decision, it enforces nondelegation
principles the only way it can—by erecting territorial boundaries that
fence out judicial policymaking “across the board.” 158 The line the
court draws is a strict one, but it helps discourage ad hoc
judicial diplomacy.
Of course, one might argue that courts can simply use traditional
judicial tools to decide whether a statue applies extraterritorially so
that the question of geographic scope is not a policy question at all,
but an interpretative one. Under this view, the Court would not be
exercising legislative power, but would be determining what
Congress would have wanted had it considered the issue. (Recall that
the presumption applies only to ambiguous statutes, so if Congress
had provided indicia of extraterritorial intent, the presumption
would be inapposite.) The problem with this approach is that when
courts are asked to divine congressional intent from silence or
ambiguous statutory language, they inevitably default to “resolving
matters of policy.” 159 This is precisely the issue the Court seeks to
remedy with the presumption—“Rather than guess anew in each
case, we apply the presumption in all cases.” 160
2. Underinclusivity and nondelegation

Critics also suggest that the underinclusivity of the presumption
against extraterritoriality makes it inadequate as a foreign relations
tool. Writing in dissent in RJR Nabisco, Justice Ginsburg argued that
157. See infra Section III.E.4.
158. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (“We
therefore apply the presumption across the board, regardless of whether there is a risk of
conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
159. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 259 (2010).
160. Id. at 261.
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barring foreign claims may increase international friction because
making causes of action “available to domestic but not foreign
plaintiffs is hardly solicitous of international comity or respectful of
foreign interests.” 161 In accord with Justice Ginsburg’s views,
Professor John Knox argues that failure to enforce U.S. law may
create “underregulated zones,” and thereby anger foreign powers.162
The risk of offending other nations by failing to enforce laws is
particularly acute in cases where the United States has prescriptive
jurisdiction to adjudicate norms of international law. 163 What’s more,
the presumption may fail to prevent conflicts with foreign powers
that claim the right to apply their law based on notions of
prescriptive jurisdiction other than territoriality, such as nationality. 164
Indeed, “there may be situations in which a permissible application
of U.S. law to foreign conduct might nevertheless create
jurisdictional conflict.” 165
As with concerns about an overbroad canon, however, these
arguments are ultimately unavailing. Even if the presumption against
extraterritoriality may result in foreign conflict, the policy decision to
extend U.S. law to events occurring in a foreign country involves a
policy choice that courts are not well-suited to make. In any given
case, a foreign nation may argue for or against the application of
U.S. law. The immense difficulty of assessing the gravity of the
situation based on litigation briefs shows why courts are best served
by declining to venture into the labyrinth of foreign policymaking. 166
Although the result may offend foreign nations, the situation is
better left to the political branches.
In addition, because the question of extraterritoriality is one of
nondelegation, consent of a foreign sovereign does not mitigate the
concerns underlying the presumption. The choice still is not the
161. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Kiobel, 133 S.
Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should treat this Nation’s interest in not becoming
a safe harbor for violators of the most fundamental international norms as an important
jurisdiction-related interest justifying application of [U.S. law].”).
162. John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.
351, 380 (2010).
163. See Clopton, supra note 53, at 12, 25.
164. Id. at 12.
165. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and Limitations of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 62, 66 (2016).
166. See infra note 273 and accompanying discussion.
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judiciary’s to make. The political branches might wish to avoid
extraterritorial application of U.S. law in a foreign country—even
when welcomed by the foreign nation—for diplomatic reasons
unknown to the judiciary and unamenable to publication in an
amicus brief. Or, as the Court suggested in Kiobel, foreign nations
might respond by “haul[ing] our citizens into their courts” for
conduct occurring in the United States or other foreign countries.167
The point here is not the exact type of foreign affairs consequences
that might result, but that courts are not the body the Constitution
designates to evaluate such consequences.
3. The presumption and domestic connections

Of course, the question of extraterritoriality does not arise only
in purely foreign cases, “[f]or it is a rare case of prohibited
extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of
the United States.” 168 The Court has affirmed that the presumption
is implicated even in cases where some of the relevant conduct or
effects occur in the United States. In the inimitable words of Justice
Scalia, “the presumption against extraterritorial application would be
a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
domestic activity is involved in the case.” 169 One might claim that
this approach is too restrictive because the United States likely has
grounds for jurisdiction under international law; the domestic
connection, it would seem, should avert foreign conflict. 170
Again, understanding the presumption as nondelegation sheds
light on this question. While scholars have typically assumed Justice
Scalia’s watchdog is on the lookout for foreign affairs conflicts, 171 this
seems unlikely given that Morrison mentions international conflict
only as an afterthought. 172 Indeed, Justice Scalia justifies the

167. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)
(emphasis omitted).
168. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
169. Id. (emphasis omitted).
170. See id. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (providing examples of
domestic conduct that would not satisfy the Morrison Court’s test, but have a substantial
connection to the United States).
171. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 7.
172. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (pointing to the “probability of incompatibility with
the applicable laws of other countries”).
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presumption primarily in terms of its superiority to the
indeterminate, policy-oriented tests used by lower courts to assess
the extraterritoriality of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 173 This
suggests that the watchdog to which Justice Scalia refers is charged
not merely with standing guard against foreign conflict but also with
protecting the balance of structural powers mandated by the
Constitution. Because the decision to apply a statute extraterritorially
involves enormous foreign policy power, even when the case involves
domestic elements (as most foreign affairs cases do), the Court must
apply the presumption. In doing so, it appropriately refuses a large
delegation of power to determine whether to enforce a statute
outside the borders of the United States.
B. Nondelegation, the Presumption, and Congressional Intent

Another common justification for the presumption against
extraterritoriality is the “commonsense notion that Congress
generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.” 174 This basic
rationale is the essence of the presumption against
extraterritoriality—the Court assumes that all statutes begin from a
domestic baseline. Although some call this the only legitimate
rationale for the presumption, 175 many academics contend
the presumption is not, in reality, a good proxy for
congressional intent. 176
As evidence of this view, some point to congressional responses
to cases that invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality. For
example, one year after Aramco, where the Supreme Court held that
Title VII’s employment discrimination protections did not apply to
conduct occurring in Saudi Arabia, Congress amended the statute to
apply abroad in certain cases. 177 The congressional response to

173. Id. at 258–59 (“There is no more damning indictment of the conduct and effects
test than the Second Circuit’s own declaration that the presence or absence of any single factor
which was considered in other cases . . . is not necessarily dispositive in future cases.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
174. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
175. Dodge, supra note 10, at 123.
176. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 17 (“[I]f the presumption is intended to respect
the decisions of the political branches—legislative and executive—it needs work.”).
177. Act of Nov. 21, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077–78;

461

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2017

Morrison came even faster—only one month after the Court applied
the presumption against extraterritoriality to 10(b) actions, Congress
specified that the government (but not private plaintiffs) had power
to prosecute foreign securities fraud. 178 In the eyes of the
presumption’s detractors, these legislative responses show that the
canon “does not always hit Congress’s mark.” 179 Critics also argue
that when Congress does consider whether to apply U.S. law abroad,
it does not adopt the avenue that would avoid conflict with foreign
law. As Professor Dodge explains, “avoiding conflict with foreign law
does not seem to rank very high on Congress’s list of priorities.”180
Others, such as Professor Lea Brilmayer, observe that in most cases
Congress does not consider questions of extraterritoriality and “ha[s]
no actual intent on territorial reach.” 181
Understanding the presumption against extraterritoriality as an
application of the nondelegation doctrine harmonizes the seeming
mismatch between the presumption and congressional intent. The
nondelegation paradigm suggests that the presumption’s
“commonsense” assumption about congressional intent is normative,
not descriptive. That is, because of the nondelegation concerns that
would arise if courts were tasked with making policy decisions about
the geographic scope of the seemingly numberless federal statutes
that are silent as to extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court assumes
Congress legislates domestically. Just as in recent conventional
nondelegation cases, the Court, in effect, assumes that Congress
does not intend this result because “such a ‘sweeping delegation of
legislative power’ . . . might be unconstitutional” under the
nondelegation doctrine. 182 In this sense, the “commonsense notion”
is grounded more in the Court’s views about its own role in deciding

Clopton, supra note 53, at 14.
178. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65
(2010); Clopton, supra note 53, at 14.
179. Clopton, supra note 53, at 15.
180. Dodge, supra note 10, at 116.
181. Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV.
392, 393 (1980); see also Pamela K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110
AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 57, 61 (2016) (arguing that the presumption does not “track[]
congressional intent . . . [because] it keeps raising the hurdle that Congress must clear in order
to rebut it”).
182. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum. Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607,
646 (1980).
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cases than in attempting to empirically estimate a purely hypothetical
congressional intent. 183
Moreover, congressional reaction to cases invoking the
presumption against extraterritoriality is not troubling when
considered in terms of nondelegation. Congressional responses show
only that Congress knows how to express extraterritorial intent184
and does so in a much more detailed fashion than would courts
faced with the same question. 185 In this sense, these legislative
rebuttals merely demonstrate that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is fulfilling its function as a nondelegation canon by
forcing democratic action. 186 Courts invoking the presumption
engage in an institutional dialogue with Congress, brokered by the
nondelegation principles that the presumption embodies. A court
applying the presumption essentially requests that Congress provide
more detail about the terms of a statute, rather than attempting to
divine those details from whole cloth. When Congress responds, it
may apply the statute abroad, but it supplies the details necessary for
extraterritorial application.
When Congress does supply these details, the statutes it passes
tend to provide more specific guidance than the open-ended, multifactor balancing tests courts seem to favor. 187 For example, when
Congress amended Title VII in response to Aramco, it specified that
Title VII did not apply to foreign conduct by companies not

183. This view is corroborated by defenses of interpretive canons generally. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role
of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 509 (1998) (“[T]he contemporary defense of
[interpretive canons] has shifted from empirical claims regarding legislative intent to a focus on
substantive and institutional values. Under this framework, statutory interpretation ceases to be
solely a problem of discovering meaning, [and instead] becomes an issue of institutional
competence and authority.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
184. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (noting that
congressional action to clarify the extraterritorial reach of Title VII after Aramco only
“shows . . . that Congress knows how to give a statute explicit extraterritorial effect—and how
to limit that effect to particular applications”).
185. This difference in detail reflects the differing institutional competencies of Congress
and the judiciary.
186. See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 317 (noting that nondelegation canons like the
presumption against extraterritoriality “represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing
minimalism, designed to ensure that certain choices are made by an institution with a superior
democratic pedigree”).
187. Bradley, supra note 54, at 554.
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controlled by U.S. shareholders. 188 As Professor Bradley observes,
this succinct answer to a complicated extraterritoriality question is
much different from the approach courts would likely supply. 189 By
enforcing nondelegation principles in a way that compels Congress
to act, the presumption against extraterritoriality ultimately results in
the best approximation of congressional intent—the one Congress
itself provides. 190
The presumption’s detractors argue that its ability to inspire
congressional action is significantly dulled by the impediments of the
legislative process. Because legislative inertia and veto-gates prevent
Congress from easily amending statutes in response to judicial
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality, 191 the
argument goes, the Court expects too much of Congress when it
requires a clear indication of extraterritorial intent. 192 But as critics of
the presumption themselves point out, Congress has responded to
two of the Court’s four major recent extraterritoriality cases. 193 At a
minimum, this suggests Congress can respond to some applications
of the presumption.
Even assuming the legislative process poses insurmountable
difficulties, however, this means only that extraterritorial application
of the statute is not sufficiently important to warrant congressional
action. In the words of Professor Sunstein, “there is nothing to
lament about a situation in which . . . statutes may not be applied

188. Id. at 552–53.
189. Id. at 555.
190. It is worth noting that because the Court only applies the presumption when
Congress is silent as to a statute’s extraterritoriality and has declined to divine congressional
intent in such circumstance, see, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010), the question of
empirical accuracy is all but irrelevant. Even so, the presumption may provide a better account
of political branch intent than other approaches. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
191. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 142 (arguing that courts that assume that Congress
can respond to an application of the presumption against extraterritoriality oversimplify the
issue and citing evidence that the staffers who draft statutes are unaware of the Court’s
interpretative canons) (citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 912 (2013)); see also Lemos, supra note 78, at 460 (discussing
legislative inertia in the context of the conventional nondelegation doctrine).
192. Note that these critiques are not unique to the presumption against
extraterritoriality, but are criticisms of interpretive canons generally. See Bradley, supra note
183, at 505–07.
193. See supra note 178 and accompanying discussion.
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. . . extraterritorially, without congressional authorization, and in
which Congress is unable to muster the will to give that
authorization.” 194 And while Congress may not, as a practical matter,
respond perfectly to every extraterritoriality question, 195 it is certainly
better equipped to make the complex policy decision than courts
deciding issues on an ad hoc basis.
In sum,
arguments that the presumption
against
extraterritoriality is a poor barometer of congressional intent are
significantly less problematic when one considers the presumption in
nondelegation terms. Not only do the normative nondelegation
values at the heart of the presumption against extraterritoriality
explain the “commonsense notion” that Congress legislates with
domestic issues in mind, they are also likely to prompt Congress to
clarify its intent with respect to extraterritoriality in important cases.
C. The Presumption and Accusations of Judicial Activism

Closely related to the aforementioned arguments that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is a bad proxy for
congressional intent are allegations that the Supreme Court employs
the presumption in order to override the intent of the political
branches. These accusations challenge the presumption’s viability as
a separation-of-powers canon, 196 alleging that it enables the judiciary
to flout the views of Congress and the executive in favor of
judicially-preferred ends, such as enforcing territorialism and limiting
private rights of action. Viewing the presumption against
194. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 339; see also Nielson, supra note 78, at 264–65
(“[W]hile ‘the nondelegation principle seems to raise the burdens and costs associated with the
enactment of federal law,’ and so ‘may create a “status quo bias” . . ., these “burdens and
costs” can also be seen as “an important guarantor of individual liberty, because they ensure
that national governmental power may not be brought to bear against individuals without a
consensus, established by legislative agreement . . . .”’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Loshin
& Nielson, supra note 72, at 55)).
195. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 142 (arguing that Congress may have introduced
unintended error with the poorly drafted statutory response to Morrison).
196. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 51–52 (contending that the presumption, as presently
constituted, “allow[s] the Court complete discretion to ignore congressional directives” and is
not “faithful to its origins as essentially a separation-of-powers canon designed to effectuate
legislative supremacy and judicial modesty”); see also Gardner, supra note 6, at 143 (arguing
that “the presumption has run away from its stated purpose” and that “the Supreme Court
poses as a faithful agent of congressional intent, but it is in fact a disciplinarian of Congress’s
global aspirations”).
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extraterritoriality through the lens of nondelegation reveals that the
Court is not bent on territorialism nor biased against private
litigants, but determined to ensure that—to the maximum extent
possible—policy decisions are left to the political branches.
1. Overriding legislative intent?

A
recurring
criticism
of
the presumption
against
extraterritoriality is that courts use it to supplant, rather than
interpret, congressional intent. Justice Stevens, for example, suggests
that by applying the bright-line presumption against
extraterritoriality, courts may abdicate their judicial duty “to give
statutes the most faithful reading possible.” 197 Professor Brilmayer
takes this critique a step further, arguing the Supreme Court has not
only abandoned its role as interpreter, but impermissibly assumed
the role of lawmaker, “marginaliz[ing] Congress” at the expense of
“judicial creativity.” 198 Elaborating on this view, Professor Clopton
contends that judges engage in activism whenever they restrict the
extraterritorial application of a law that Congress meant to apply
abroad. 199 From this perspective, because the presumption obtains
only when a statute’s extraterritorial application is unclear, there is
always a chance that a court applying the presumption is engaging
in activism. 200
Admittedly,
application
of
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality suffers from the same drawback that plagues
conventional applications of the nondelegation doctrine—although
the presumption attempts to say “this matter is for Congress to
resolve,” it may instead establish a default rule of territoriality, a
result that Congress may or may not have intended for any given
statute. 201 As critics of the presumption have pointed out,
territoriality, too, is a policy choice.
These arguments, though superficially appealing, ignore the
197. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 280 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
198. Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 656 (2011).
199. Clopton, supra note 53, at 16.
200. Id.
201. Lemos, supra note at 78, at 459.
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realities of the adjudicative process. Unfortunately, the judiciary does
not have the luxury of tabling an issue for future consideration or
referring the question to another body. 202 In extraterritoriality cases,
this leaves lower courts with a Hobson’s choice between actively
making policy decisions about whether to extend U.S. law abroad or
enforcing the territorial status quo until Congress decides otherwise.
When the presumption against extraterritoriality is understood as
nondelegation it becomes clear that courts applying the presumption
are not merely entrenching a preferred territorial default, but
protecting structural values. 203 That these structural decisions have
practical impacts is inescapable, but it does not mean that courts
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality are engaging in
activism. Even if invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality
involves decisions with practical effects, “[a] certain degree
of discretion, and thus of lawmaking inheres in most . . .
judicial action.” 204
By applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
Supreme Court thus provides lower courts with the means to avoid
the nondelegation issues that would arise if judges were required to
decide whether Congress would have wanted a statute to apply
abroad. While the presumption directs courts to make a clear,
circumscribed inquiry, many alternatives would have judges
navigating the treacherous straits of international diplomacy to
determine when extraterritoriality is advisable. In other words, at
least in the context of deciding whether U.S. law should apply
abroad, the Court is choosing the structural option that results in
the least judicial policymaking.

202. Although courts might instead invoke the political question or other justiciability
doctrines to avoid considering politically-charged extraterritoriality cases altogether, use of
these doctrines would do little to satisfy critics of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
since judicial examination of extraterritorial cases would only decrease.
203. In this sense, when the Supreme Court applies the presumption against
extraterritoriality, it engages in what Professor Bradley calls “structural activism”—“designed
to protect the separation of powers between the judiciary and the political branches . . . and
. . . more comfortably within the competence and authority of the judiciary than activism in
applying statutes extraterritorially.” Bradley, supra note 54, at 551–52 n.231. Of course, the
term “structural activism” is somewhat of a misnomer, since the Court seems to be exercising
judicial power to fulfill, quite appropriately, its responsibility to police the structural
boundaries put in place by the Constitution.
204. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384–85 (1989).
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Those who oppose the presumption against extraterritoriality
also point out the potential for judicial abuse associated with
identifying precisely when an activity is excessively extraterritorial. 205
The Supreme Court’s test for this inquiry is whether the
extraterritorial activity in question relates to the “focus” of Congress’
statutory concern; if it does, and Congress is silent regarding foreign
application, the presumption applies. 206 Not only is it difficult to
pinpoint Congress’ regulatory objective, these critics argue, the
broad nature of the “focus” inquiry is susceptible to judicial
cherry-picking.
While determining the “focus” of statutory text may be
difficult207—and the Court has admittedly not afforded lower courts
much guidance on this issue 208—the question becomes one of
construing the existing text, rather than divining the meaning of
congressional silence. The requirement that the domestic conduct
pertain to the “focus” of the statute ensures that Congress has truly
made the choice regarding the policy at issue. If the presumption
were overcome merely because a case has minor ties to the United
States, but the activity Congress was seeking to regulate occurred
outside the United States, courts would still be left making the
policy-wrought decision of extraterritoriality for statutes silent on
that point. Though demanding and potentially open to abuse, the
task is one for which courts are constitutionally charged and
institutionally capable.
2. Lack of deference to the executive branch

The presumption has also come under fire for giving insufficient
weight to the views of the executive branch. 209 Although courts have
often consulted the views of the executive in foreign affairs
matters, 210 the Court has sometimes applied the presumption against
205. See Clopton, supra note 53, at 7 (“[N]othing in the canonical statement of the
presumption tells courts what qualifies as an extraterritorial case.”).
206. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
207. Brilmayer, supra note 181, at 393.
208. Gardner, supra note 6, at 135–36.
209. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 17.
210. The Supreme Court previously went so far as to call the executive branch the “one
voice” for the nation in foreign affairs. See David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 953, 954 (2014); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
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extraterritoriality over objections by the executive branch. This was
the case in both Morrison, which declined to follow the Solicitor
General’s view that private securities suits could be based on foreign
conduct, 211 and Aramco, which did not accept the EEOC’s
arguments that Title VII should apply abroad. 212
Although the presumption’s seeming disregard for the views of
the executive is at first perplexing, this result makes sense under the
nondelegation paradigm. The Court often considers the executive’s
views in matters of foreign affairs, 213 but the question of
extraterritoriality is a question of constitutional structure. Such
questions belong to the judiciary. 214 This does not mean the Supreme
Court ignores the institutional role of the executive branch as a
leading voice in foreign affairs. Indeed, the check of prosecutorial
discretion may mitigate some of the concerns of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 215 But while the executive’s views may be
helpful to provide context or to explain potential policy implications,
it is the responsibility of courts to determine whether there is
sufficient congressional intent to displace the nondelegation
concerns that would inhere if Congress had delegated the task of
discerning a statute’s geographic scope to the courts. In other words,
even if the Court adopted the executive’s position, the decision
would still be the product of judicial policymaking—an outcome
contrary to the nondelegation principles underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality.
3. Scrutiny of private rights of action

The Supreme Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco spurred new
separation-of-powers attacks on the Court’s presumption against
320 (1936).
211. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270.
212. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
213. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
214. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (calling determination of whether
a statute impinged on the President’s constitutional recognition power a “familiar judicial
exercise”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983) (holding that “[r]esolution of litigation
challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches” was a decision for
the courts).
215. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (citing Sosa v.
Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)).
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extraterritoriality doctrine. Commentators took particular issue216
with the Court’s decision to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality separately to RICO’s private cause of action rather
than ending its inquiry after finding that the substantive provisions
of the statute applied extraterritorially. 217 Just as Justice Ginsburg
argued in dissent in RJR Nabisco, these commentators suggest that
the Court ought to adopt a statutory interpretation “linking, not
separating, prohibited activities and authorized remedies.”218
Professor Anthony Colangelo, for example, argues that because
Congress provided a clear indication that RICO’s substantive
prohibitions applied abroad, applying the presumption to RICO’s
private action “transform[ed] the statute that Congress enacted into
one the Court would have preferred.” 219 This, he claims, is the latest
leg of a “myopic quest to quash the private right of action in
transnational cases.” 220 In line with Colangelo’s views, Maggie
Gardner asserts that by applying the presumption separately to
private remedies, the Court was moving the goalposts—imposing a
“series of hoops” to make it so “Congress cannot win.” 221
a. Private rights and nondelegation generally. Contrary to these
arguments, there is a principled, structural explanation for the
Court’s use of the presumption against extraterritoriality. In RJR
Nabisco, the Court explains why it applies the presumption against
extraterritoriality separately to RICO’s private right of action: “‘Each
of th[e] decisions’ involved in defining a cause of action based on
‘conduct within the territory of another sovereign’ ‘carries with it
significant foreign policy implications.’” 222 The Court applies the
presumption because of the distinct policy decisions involved with
authorizing private causes of action to conduct occurring

216. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 6, at 135 (warning of “worrisome implications for
separation of powers”).
217. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (“[W]e separately apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality to RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has
been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions.”).
218. Id. at 2113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 53.
220. Id. at 55.
221. Gardner, supra note 6, at 141, 143.
222. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013)).
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outside U.S. borders. In other words, the Court is concerned
about nondelegation.
When Congress creates a private cause of action but fails to
specify whether it applies extraterritorially, it leaves outstanding “a
decision to permit enforcement without the check of prosecutorial
discretion.” 223 Because that decision—whether to “provid[e] a
private civil remedy for foreign conduct”—involves a “potential for
international friction beyond that presented by merely applying U.S.
substantive law to that foreign conduct,” 224 it is a foreign policy
choice independent of the decision to recognize a cause of action in
the first place.
By applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court
recognizes that both of these choices belong to Congress. Just as
implying a right of action for domestic litigants “allows the Judicial
Branch to assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution
in the Legislative Branch,” 225 extending such a right to foreign
plaintiffs without clear intent from Congress would impermissibly
exercise lawmaking power.
Hence, where Congress fails to speak on the extraterritoriality
issue, the Court applies the presumption to reject a delegation of
policymaking authority and avoid enlisting courts in unilaterally
extending the power and protections of U.S. law abroad. 226

223. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
224. Id.
225. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 743, 747 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“T]he implication of a right of action not authorized by Congress denigrates the democratic
process . . . . [I]t is the constitutional function of the Legislative Branch, subject as it is to the
checks of the political process, to make this judgment.”); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
226. Commentators have also questioned why the Supreme Court seems to scrutinize the
extraterritoriality of private causes of action more intensely than it does the substantive
provisions administered by the government. The Court provided some explanation when it
stated, “The creation of a private right of action raises issues beyond the mere consideration
whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or not, entailing, for example, a
decision to permit enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion.” Id.
(quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727). From a nondelegation vantage point, this result may appear
somewhat puzzling. If courts should not make the policy decision regarding extraterritoriality,
why can they do so when the executive branch is bringing the case? One possible answer is that
considered together, the executive and judicial branches have enough residual legislative power
to allow extraterritorial suits to go forward without implicating separation-of-powers concerns.
But the simpler answer is that, in the cases that find the presumption against extraterritoriality
rebutted as to substantive provisions of the statute, there has been a clear indication of
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b. Comparing statutory and judicially-implied causes of action.
Critics have contended that the Court’s concern with the private
cause of action is misplaced because Congress itself created the cause
of action. In particular, these commentators criticize the RJR
Nabisco majority’s reliance on Kiobel and Sosa. In those cases,
decided under the ATS, the cause of action had to be implied by
courts, whereas in RJR Nabisco, Congress had already provided the
cause of action by statute. 227 Because the political branches intended
RICO to apply to criminal activity abroad and also enacted a private
right of action, the argument goes, any concerns about the
extraterritorial application of the private right “had already been
(democratically) taken into account and overcome,” making
the Court’s application of the presumption “incongruous
and selective.” 228
Assuming that Congress has considered the extraterritoriality
question with respect to private actions, however, begs the question.
The argument that statutory text showing Congress intends a
statute’s criminal provisions to apply extraterritorially is evidence that
Congress also intends the statute’s separate private right of action to
extend to extraterritorial conduct requires an inferential step. This is
particularly true of RICO, which does not expressly address the
extraterritoriality of the statute’s criminal provisions at all, but leaves
that question to the statutes that specify predicate offenses. 229 Thus,
the Court’s application of the presumption against extraterritoriality
to private rights of action is based on the equally permissible notion
that Congress does not intend such actions to apply abroad.230
Considered in light of the nondelegation concerns that drive the
presumption against extraterritoriality, it is not difficult to see why
the Court errs on the side of applying the presumption.
c. Private claims and political branch intent. Not only is applying
the presumption against extraterritoriality separately to criminal and
private rights of action at least an equally acceptable statutory
congressional intent to that effect. Thus, while the Court sometimes seems to treat executive
prosecutorial discretion as a thumb on the scale, it has not yet proven to be a decisive factor.
227. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 54.
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
230. Under this view, the Court does not flout the democratic process at all because
Congress never considered whether the private right should apply abroad in the first place.
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construction, there is evidence that both political branches prefer this
interpretation. Congress, as noted above, responded to the Morrison
Court’s call to clarify the extraterritorial scope of the Exchange Act
of 1934 by specifying that the criminal provisions of section 10(b)
apply to fraudulent activity and sales occurring abroad. 231 Notably,
however, Congress declined to provide for the extraterritorial
application of private 10(b) actions. 232 The executive branch, for its
part, has argued in several contexts that courts should interpret
ambiguous statutes to allow federal prosecutors to penalize foreign
wrongdoing but limit private actions to conduct with a close
domestic connection. 233 This was the case in both RJR Nabisco and
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 234 as well as in various
antitrust cases heard by circuit courts. 235 These anecdotes suggest
that not only does the Court’s application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality not disregard the democratic process, but
may also result in outcomes that the political branches approve. 236
Ultimately, allegations that the Court’s use of the presumption is
motivated by anti-litigant activism fail to address why an activist
judiciary bent on restricting private suits would adopt such a
restrictive interpretative tool. If the Court’s goal is to decimate
private actions, 237 the presumption against extraterritoriality is a
strange choice of armament. 238 In a war on private actions, surely the
231. See supra note 178 and accompanying discussion.
232. Stephan, supra note 110, at 42 (“Significantly, however, [Congress] left the rules for
private litigation where Morrison had determined them.”).
233. Note, however, that the Solicitor General would have allowed the Morrison
litigants’s claim to go forward. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264 (2010).
234. 542 US 155 (2004); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Vacatur at 30, RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (No. 15-138);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20–21, F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 234125,
at *20–21.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015); Motorola
Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015).
236. Of course, the presumption would be necessary even if Congress wanted courts to
decide whether causes of action apply extraterritorially. Judicial acceptance of such a delegation
would inappropriately “invite[] Congress to avoid resolution of the often controversial
question whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced through private litigation.”
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
237. See Colangelo, supra note 5, at 55.
238. After all, nondelegation canons like the presumption against extraterritoriality “must
rest on something other than judicial policy preferences” in order to be accepted as interpretive
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Court would have chosen a weapon that would allow it the
discretion to strike down private cases with impunity. The Court’s
restrained approach suggests that it uses the presumption to further
structural rather than policy goals.
To summarize, criticism of the presumption against extraterritoriality on the grounds of judicial activism and separation of
powers ultimately does not bear out. When understood in
nondelegation terms, it is clear that the presumption is not carte
blanche for activist judges with territorial sympathies, but a check on
delegations of policymaking power to the judiciary. Viewed in this
light, the Supreme Court’s treatment of executive-branch positions
and private rights of action show that it is fulfilling its constitutional
role of ensuring that the political branches make major
policy decisions.
D. The Presumption’s Application to Jurisdictional Statutes

Another question that has vexed foreign relations scholars after
both Kiobel and RJR Nabisco involves the Supreme Court’s
declaration that courts must apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality “regardless of whether the statute in question
regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.”239
This pronouncement troubles scholars because the presumption
against extraterritoriality is a merits determination—they worry that
lower courts would (and have) incorrectly applied the presumption
as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction, 240 contrary to the Supreme
Court’s clarification on the subject in Morrison. 241 As Professor
William Dodge argues, the presumption, correctly understood,
should apply only to implied causes of action underlying purely
jurisdictional statutes, such as the federal common law causes of
action under the Alien Tort Statute to which the Court applied the
presumption in Kiobel. 242
canons. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 339.
239. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
240. Colangelo, supra note 5, at 52–53.
241. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (clarifying that the
question of extraterritorial reach is a merits determination, not a potential limit on subject
matter jurisdiction).
242. William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply
to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS, (July 1, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://opinio
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Dodge’s analysis rings true, but there is a broader point here.
The Court applies the presumption against extraterritoriality to the
causes of action underlying jurisdictional statutes because the
presumption is a nondelegation canon. Specifically, application of
nondelegation principles, of which the presumption against
extraterritoriality is an example, seems to turn on whether there are
separation concerns as a de facto matter. The Supreme Court’s
discussion of the separation-of-powers principles that underlie the
nondelegation doctrine in Mistretta is instructive on this score.
In Mistretta, the Court considered a challenge to the
constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a unique body
located within the judicial branch but not endowed with judicial
power. 243 In analyzing whether the placement of the Commission
violated separation of powers principles, the Court turned to Justice
John Marshall’s nondelegation discussion in Wayman for the
proposition that the judicial branch may assume certain
administrative and rulemaking duties to the extent “necessary and
proper . . . for carrying into execution all the judgments which the
judicial department has power to pronounce.” 244
When the petitioners in Mistretta argued that the Commission’s
power was impermissible because it was substantive, rather than
merely procedural, the Court stated: “Our separation-of-powers
analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity as ‘substantive’ as
opposed to ‘procedural,’ or ‘political’ as opposed to ‘judicial.’”245
Instead, the Court focused on the practical consequences of the
congressional delegation—namely, whether it threatened to
“expand[] the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds
by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-legislative power
of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.” 246 In other
words, the relevant question was not the nature of the grant of
power, but the separation-of-powers consequences it would produce.
The same applies in cases with questions of extraterritoriality—the
relevant question is not the nature of the statute, but whether it calls

juris.org/2016/07/01/32658/.
243. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384–85 (1989).
244. Id. at 387–88 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825)).
245. Id. at 393.
246. Id.
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upon courts to make policy choices in the sensitive area of foreign
affairs. Because those policy choices arise whenever there is an
extraterritoriality gap, and such gaps arise in connection with both
substantive statutes and the implied rights of action underlying
jurisdictional statutes, the Court applies the presumption
in both instances. Thus, the nondelegation understanding
of the presumption against extraterritoriality sheds light on
why the Court speaks of applying the presumption to
jurisdictional statutes.
E. Nondelegation Deficiencies of Alternatives to the Presumption

Another major theme of the criticisms leveled against the
presumption against extraterritoriality is that its blunt, categorical
approach is not nimble enough to address the complexities involved
in international cases. 247 These scholars argue that even if the Court’s
justifications for the presumption are valid, the Court does not
adequately explain why it does not use a more flexible alternative. 248
To fill this void, critics of the presumption have suggested a variety
of tests to determine when U.S. law should apply abroad. This
Section argues that understanding the presumption against
extraterritoriality as nondelegation explains why the Supreme Court
has preferred the presumption over three other approaches
to the extraterritoriality question: applying the Charming
Betsy canon, using limiting principles, and divining congressional
intent. Because each of these proposed alternatives calls upon
courts to make foreign policy determinations, principles of
nondelegation counsel in favor of applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality.
1. The Charming Betsy canon

Some commentators have suggested that the Court should
discard the presumption against extraterritoriality in favor of the

247. Buxbaum, supra note 165, at 62 (arguing that the territorial approach is insufficient
to “address the messy and often unpredictable patterns of transnational economic activity”).
248. E.g., Vasquez, supra note 149, at 69 (observing that the presumption is an
inefficient means for managing foreign policy conflict and that other approaches, too, are
“designed to avoid clashes with the laws and policies of other nations”).
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Charming Betsy canon. 249 The Charming Betsy canon originates in
the 1804 case of the same name and instructs courts that “act[s] of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.” 250 In other words, where a
statute is ambiguous, a court applying the Charming Betsy canon will
adopt an interpretation that conforms with international law, under
the assumption that Congress does not intend to violate
international law unless it expressly says so. Proponents of
substituting the Charming Betsy canon for the presumption against
extraterritoriality would tie the question of extraterritoriality to
international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction. 251 These
principles specify when nations can permissibly exercise jurisdiction
and, according to the most recent Restatement, allow states to
adjudicate claims based not only on territoriality but also on
nationality and conduct that causes effects in or is directed at the
state in question. 252
Deciding questions of extraterritoriality using only the Charming
Betsy canon would require courts to assume Congress intends
statutes to apply abroad to the maximum extent that international
law will allow. 253 This is a departure from the traditional conception
of the Charming Betsy canon, which has traditionally been used as a
“braking mechanism”—courts typically apply the canon “to restrain
the scope of federal enactments . . . not . . . to give such enactments
a more expansive reading.” 254
There are important nondelegation reasons for believing that the
Court should not use the Charming Betsy canon in such an
aggressive
fashion.
Applying
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality is still necessary because even when Congress can
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law, the
question of whether U.S. law should apply extraterritorially still
involves a foreign policy choice. In Morrison, for example, even
though the “effects” test would have been a valid and
249. See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 53, at 23–25.
250. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
251. Clopton, supra note 53, at 23–25.
252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
253. Clopton, supra note 53, at 24–25.
254. Bradley, supra note 183, at 490.
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uncontroversial exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction under the wellaccepted subjective territorial principle, 255 foreign amici still objected
to the application of U.S. law. 256 The point here is not to show that
the presumption against extraterritoriality is a superior tool for
averting foreign conflict, but to suggest that the extraterritoriality
decision still involves policy choices when principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction would allow U.S. law to apply
abroad. In short, the Charming Betsy canon does not resolve
nondelegation issues.
Additionally, those who argue for replacing the presumption
with the Charming Betsy canon overlook that their critique of the
presumption against extraterritoriality as a tool of judicial activism to
override congressional intent is a criticism of interpretative canons
generally. 257 By advocating for a different canon, these critics merely
argue that the Court should adopt the canon that reflects their
policy preference—that US law should apply abroad to the
maximum extent that international law allows. By contrast, the
Supreme Court’s use of the presumption against extraterritoriality
draws its legitimacy not from ideas about the ideal conduct of
foreign relations policy, but from the structural principles that
underlie the nondelegation doctrine. To apply only the Charming
Betsy canon would be to give courts full discretion to decide
a statute’s geographic scope. This, the Court’s recent
extraterritoriality cases show, is simply unacceptable from a
nondelegation perspective.
As a result, courts should apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality first, since it does the best job of ensuring that
Congress—not courts—decides the question of extraterritoriality. In
cases where the presumption does not apply or is overcome, the
Charming Betsy canon acts as a backstop to avert extreme foreign
relations results. This approach is in line with that endorsed by the
Supreme Court in cases where the presumption against
extraterritoriality does not apply. 258 In any event, the presumption
255. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
401 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
256. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010).
257. See Bradley, supra note 183, at 505–07.
258. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); see also Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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against extraterritoriality’s superior protection of nondelegation
values may explain the Supreme Court’s continued adherence to the
presumption in foreign relations cases.
2. Discretionary limiting principles

The nondelegation principles preserved by the presumption
against extraterritoriality also explain why the Supreme Court clings
to the presumption instead of embracing more flexible alternatives.
In his concurring opinion in Kiobel, Justice Breyer proposed a
“jurisdictional”
alternative
to
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality that focuses on whether the person violating the
statute is an American national and whether the violation occurred in
the United States or violated an important American national
interest. 259 This initial inquiry would “rel[y] upon courts also
invoking” “[f]urther limiting principles” such as exhaustion of
remedies, forum non conveniens, and international comity.260
It would also “depend[] (for its workability) upon courts
obtaining, and paying particular attention to, the views of the
Executive Branch.” 261
This discretionary approach fails for reasons grounded in the
nondelegation doctrine. 262 The approach is largely indeterminate,
offering lower courts no analytical structure and little guidance.
Courts are left to determine on a case-by-case basis whether they
should recognize foreign comity interests, defer to the executive,
require that plaintiffs exhaust remedies in other tribunals, or simply
259. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Note that Justice Breyer is apparently not categorically opposed
to the presumption against extraterritoriality. He concurred with the Court’s application of the
presumption in Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. In RJR Nabisco, he concurred with the Court’s use
of the presumption with respect to RICO’s substantive provisions, but he also argued that the
presumption should not apply separately to the statute’s private right of action. RJR Nabisco,
Inc. v. European Cmty.,136 S. Ct. 2090, 2116 (2016).
260. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674, 1677.
261. Id.
262. Justice Breyer had earlier applied a version of this open-ended inquiry in Empagran,
an antitrust case in which foreign victims of an international price-fixing conspiracy
perpetuated by a foreign vitamin cartel attempted to seek redress under the U.S. antitrust laws.
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). Writing for the Court,
Justice Breyer held that notions of international comity required the Court to find that claims
brought by foreign victims for foreign antitrust violations committed by foreign cartelists were
not actionable under the U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 165.
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decide that the case is better suited for an alternative forum. In
effect, this method gives courts free reign both to decide what is
“reasonable” in any given case and to enforce that result with the
judicial doctrine of their choosing. That Justice Breyer’s test
recommends that courts obtain and give weight to the views of the
executive branch provides little comfort. In RJR Nabisco, for
example, Justice Breyer suggested that the majority had deferred too
much to the executive branch’s claims that private RICO suits were
detrimental to international relations. 263 This suggests that the
decision of extraterritoriality would be almost completely within
the discretion of the judiciary—a result that runs afoul
of nondelegation.
Also troubling is Justice Breyer’s suggestion that courts
determine what types of extraterritorial conduct implicate
“important American national interest[s].” 264 This proposal would
require courts to determine when national interests are at stake and
define those interests in the first place. But identifying the nation’s
priorities is the province of the democratically-accountable political
branches; when the task requires interpreting the will and interests of
the body politic, it is paramount that the people’s chosen
representatives make the decision. Hence, this discretionary
approach invites judges to engage in foreign policy-making—a
responsibility the Constitution delegates to Congress, not
the judiciary.
3. Divining congressional intent

Another approach to determining extraterritoriality when the
statute in question is silent or ambiguous is to determine what
Congress would have wanted had it considered the issue. This
approach, which the Court expressly repudiated in Morrison, was
espoused by the Second Circuit, other courts of appeal, and Justice
Stevens. 265 Predictably, the nondelegation doctrine sheds light on
why the Court opted to apply the presumption against

263. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2116 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Breyer
did not expressly apply the framework he introduced in Kiobel, in RJR Nabisco, or, for that
matter, in Morrison.
264. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671.
265. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257–61 (2010).
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extraterritoriality instead of attempting to determine what Congress
would have done had it considered whether the statute should apply
to foreign activity.
The majority opinion in Morrison expresses a marked distaste for
the “unpredictable and inconsistent” conduct and effects tests used
by lower courts to determine extraterritoriality in section 10(b)
claims. 266 The Court rejected the notion that congressional silence
invited the judiciary to “divin[e] what Congress would have wanted”
if it had considered the matter and that courts should consider new
factors in any given case. 267
Morrison’s rejection of the post-hoc-intent approach comports
with nondelegation principles. As Justice Scalia observed, deciding
what Congress would have wanted ultimately boils down to a policy
choice. 268 By rejecting tests that may invite expansive judicial
policymaking in favor of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
Morrison upholds structural nondelegation norms. The
presumption’s ability to preserve structural norms helps
explain why the Court continues to apply it instead of
attempting to construct congressional intent as to the scope of
geoambiguous statutes.
4. A note on institutional competence

The preceding paragraphs illustrate that alternatives to the
presumption against extraterritoriality—applying the Charming Betsy
canon, using limiting principles, and divining congressional intent—
all take for granted that the Court should use some sort of
interpretative device to determine if extraterritoriality is appropriate
for a statute. Each of the approaches fails to consider, however, that
Congress, not courts, should make the sensitive policy decision of
extraterritoriality. Although insistence on congressional policymaking
may seem unduly doctrinaire, there are important functional
justifications for enforcing nondelegation with respect to the

266. Id. at 256, 258, 260 (criticizing the various formulations of the conduct and effects
tests as “complex in formulation,” “unpredictable in application,” and estranged from any
“textual or even extra textual” foundation).
267. Id. at 256.
268. Id. at 259.
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judiciary. Courts are “fundamentally underequipped to formulate
national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in
nature” 269—the type of choices inherent in questions of statutory
extraterritoriality. This idea—that the Constitution does not endow
courts with the tools necessary for policymaking—is an important
motivation of both the nondelegation doctrine and the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 270
Without the resources to engage in a comprehensive review of an
issue, judges must make decisions based on relatively limited
knowledge. This handicap, a result of the Constitution’s institutional
design, means federal courts are unable to evaluate issues
holistically. 271 Judges may decide only the cases and controversies
before them, so issues can be resolved only—and quite literally—on
a case-by-case basis. 272 The judiciary also lacks the flexibility the
political branches enjoy. Because of stare decisis and the weight of
precedent, courts cannot easily reverse course if a decision produces
inadvertent negative foreign policy consequences. Courts, in
other words, are not functionally prepared to make foreign
policy decisions.
Because of these deficiencies, enforcing nondelegation as to the
judiciary does not pose the same drawbacks as limiting delegations to
executive agencies—there is no trade-off between formalism and
functionalism. While agencies have the expertise to excel in the
specialized fields they regulate, unelected judges are generally illsuited to assume policy-making roles. Courts have no informationgathering capacity to speak of; their review is largely limited to
litigation briefs.
269. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (quoting
United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
270. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)
(applying the presumption against extraterritoriality because “[congress] alone has the facilities
necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision”); James O. Freedman, Delegation
of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 CHI. L. REV. 307, 317–22 (1976).
271. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 140
(2d ed. 1996) (“Judge-made law . . . can serve foreign policy only interstitially, grossly, and
spasmodically; [courts’] attempts to draw lines and make exceptions must be bound in
doctrine and justified in reasoned opinions, and they cannot provide flexibility, completeness,
and comprehensive coherence.”).
272. Nielson, supra note 78, at 268 (“Generalist judges are ‘not experts’ and they
‘encounter issues one case at a time, which may make it hard for them to see the big picture.’”
(quoting Lemos, supra note 78, at 445–46)).
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These informational limitations are particularly acute in the
context of foreign affairs. Unlike the executive branch and Congress,
the Supreme Court cannot maintain a running diplomatic dialogue
with foreign nations. The Court’s use of amicus briefs in RJR
Nabisco provides a poignant example of the judiciary’s institutional
incapacity to conduct foreign affairs. In RJR Nabisco, the Court
attempted to grapple with this drawback by looking to amicus briefs
filed in previous extraterritoriality cases by the same European
countries who were the respondents in RJR Nabisco. 273 The Court
noted that while the respondent countries wanted to avail themselves
of RICO’s private treble damages action, these countries had
previously warned that private treble damages suits based on foreign
conduct in antitrust cases would have “unjustifiably permit[ed] their
citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby
upsetting a balance of competing considerations that their own
domestic . . . laws embody.” 274 Citing this discrepancy, the Court
declined to apply a “double standard” to foreign countries and other
private plaintiffs. 275
The RJR Nabisco Court’s use of amicus briefs from previous
cases is rather unusual. 276 Professor Bookman argues this
“unprecedented” use of prior amicus briefs is an unfortunate
instance of “gotcha” diplomacy that undermines the Court’s claims
of preserving international harmony. 277 These arguments are welltaken, but they only reinforce the necessity of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Without the diplomatic intelligence
available to other branches, courts are left grasping for whatever

273. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106–07 (2016).
274. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Alito also cited to amicus briefs submitted in
Morrison, where France—a respondent in RJR Nabisco—warned that allowing private U.S.
securities claims based on extraterritorial activity would interfere with foreign securities
regulatory regimes, “upset[ing a] delicate balance and offend[ing] the sovereign interests of
foreign nations.” Id. at 2107 (citations omitted).
275. Id. at 2108.
276. Bookman, supra note 181, at 60; see also Kristen Eichensehr, Legal scholarship
highlight: Foreign-government amici and foreign relations, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 21, 2016,
11:21 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/legal-scholarship-highlight-foreigngovernment-amici-and-foreign-relations/ (noting that while it is unusual for the Supreme
Court to use a party’s previous amicus briefs against it, reliance on the amicus briefs of foreign
governments is common practice in foreign relations cases).
277. Bookman, supra note 181, at 60.
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information they can marshal to make difficult decisions about
sensitive foreign affairs issues. By applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the Court can avoid 278 the jurisprudential
equivalent of bringing a knife to a gunfight—inserting itself into the
explosive realm of foreign affairs armed only with law clerks and
litigation briefs.
In short, the nondelegation view of the presumption against
extraterritoriality helps explain why the Supreme Court prefers the
categorical presumption to other, more discretionary alternatives. As
the foregoing evaluation of three of these alternatives—the
Charming Betsy canon, limiting principles, and constructed
congressional intent—suggests, discretionary approaches fail to
adequately protect against the potential for judicial policymaking.
The presumption against extraterritoriality, on the other hand,
accounts for nondelegation concerns and the institutional
competence considerations that inform them.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s recent applications of the presumption
against extraterritoriality signal a more robust insistence on clear
congressional indications that statutes apply outside the territorial
borders of the United States. This Comment has argued that this
insistence is driven not by judicial preference, but principles of
nondelegation. By applying the presumption, the Supreme Court
rebuffs a broad congressional delegation of policymaking
responsibility to the judiciary—the decision of whether U.S. law
should apply abroad. Understanding the presumption against
extraterritoriality as nondelegation makes clear that the Supreme
Court is motivated not by a penchant for territorialism, but the need
to preserve structural values. In addition to shedding light on
previously unanswered questions regarding the presumption’s
rationales and application, the nondelegation paradigm explains why
the Court prefers the presumption to other approaches to managing
foreign conflict. Ultimately, the presumption ensures that sensitive

278. Note that the RJR Nabisco Court’s discussion of foreign amicus briefs was dicta
used to support its application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. See RJR Nabisco,
136 S. Ct. at 2106–08. Still, it illustrates the type of information upon which the Court might
be forced to rely in the absence of the presumption.
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questions of foreign policy are made by the branches most
competent to do so—those elected through the democratic process.
In this sense, the presumption against extraterritoriality is less about
territorial boundaries and more about constitutional ones.
Luke Bell ∗
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